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Abstract: Emotion and trust are two important concerns for the elaboration of inter-
action systems that would be closer and more attractive to their users, in particular
by endowing machines with the ability to predict, understand, and process emotions
and trust. This paper attempts to construct a common logical framework for the rep-
resentation of emotion and trust. This logical framework combines a logic of belief
and choice, a logic of time, and a dynamic logic. Using this common framework,
we identify formal relations between trust and emotions, for which we also provide
behavioral validation.
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1 Introduction
The rapidly growing field of affective computing aims at developing interaction systems that are
closer and more attractive to their users, in particular by endowing machines with the ability to
predict, understand, and process emotions (on the one hand), and trust (on the other hand). In
this article, we introduce a unified logical approach to represent the cognitive structure of some
emotions, of trust/distrust, and their relations at a formal level.
We formalize the concepts of emotions as well as trust/distrust based on cognitive models
proposed by cognitive psychologists. Regarding emotions, we draw on cognitive theories (for
more detail, see [SSJ01]) which assume that emotions are closely tied to changes in beliefs and
desires. We capitalize on psychological models that allow to recognize and distinguish emotions
based on their decomposition in cognitive factors particularly the cognitive structure of emotion
of Ortony et al. [OCC88], the cognitive patterns of emotion of Lazarus [Laz91] and the belief-
desire theory of emotion (BDTE) [Rei09, Dre95]. Similarly, we attempt to adhere closely to
cognitive definition of trust [CF01] and distrust [CFL08].
Although there are tight conceptual connections between emotion and trust [Lah01], and al-
though there ware some separated formalization of the concepts of trust as the works of Herzig
et al. [HLH+08], and the concepts of emotions such as the works of Adam et al. [AHL09] and
Steunebrink et al. [SDM07b, SDM07a], there is not yet a common logic to represent them both.
Our work aims at filling that gap by formally representing trust and emotions in a common logic;
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this common logic will enable us to lay bare the formal relations between trust and emotion.
The logic we offer is a combination of the logic of beliefs and choices as the one of Herzig and
Longin [HL04] (a refinement from Cohen and Levesque [CL90]), the logic of time (introduced
by Arthur Prior [Pri57]), and dynamic logic introduced by Fischer and Ladner [FL79] and Harel
et al. [HKT00].
This paper is organized as follows: Part 2 introduces the logical framework. Part 3 formalizes
the cognitive structure of some emotions, Part 4 formalizes the cognitive structure of trust and
distrust. Part 5 shows some formal relations in the effect of trust/distrust on the emotions, and
provides behavioral validation for these relations.
2 Logical Framework
Syntax. The syntactic primitives of our logic are as follows: a nonempty finite set of agents
AGT = {i1, i2, . . . , in}, a nonempty finite set of atomic events EVT = {e1,e2, . . . ,ep}, and a
nonempty set of atomic propositions ATM = {p1, p2, . . .}. The variables i, j, k. . . denote agents.
The expression i1:e1 ∈ AGT ×EVT denotes an event e1 intentionally caused by agent i1 and e1
is thus called an “action”. The variables α , β . . . denote such actions. The language of our logic
is defined by the following BNF :
ϕ :=p | i:α-happens | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ | Xϕ | X−1ϕ | Gϕ | Beli ϕ | Choicei ϕ | GrdIϕ
where p ranges over ATM, i:α ranges over AGT×EVT , i:α-happens ranges over ATM for each
i:α ∈AGT×EVT , and I ⊆AGT . The classical boolean connectives ∧ (conjunction),→ (material
implication), ↔ (material equivalence), > (tautology) and ⊥ (contradiction) are defined from ¬
(negation) and ∨ (disjunction).
i:α-happens reads “agent i is just about to perform the action α”; Xϕ reads “ϕ will be true
next instant”; X−1ϕ reads “ϕ was true at the previous instant”; Gϕ reads “henceforth, ϕ is true”;
Beli ϕ reads “agent i believes that ϕ is true”; Choicei ϕ reads “agent i prefers that ϕ be true”;
GrdIϕ reads “ϕ is publicly grounded between the agents in group I” (It is nothing else than a
standard common belief operator). We define the following abbreviations:
i:α-done
def
= X−1i:α-happens (Defi:α-done)
Happensi:αϕ
def
= i:α-happens∧Xϕ (DefHappensi:α )
Afteri:αϕ
def
= i:α-happens→ Xϕ (DefAfteri:α )
Donei:αϕ
def
= i:α-done∧X−1ϕ (DefDonei:α )
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Fϕ
def
= ¬G¬ϕ (DefF)
Goali ϕ
def
= ChoiceiFBeli ϕ (DefGoali )
Intendi α
def
= ChoiceiFi:α-happens (DefIntendi )
Capableiα
def
= ¬Afteri:α⊥ (DefCapablei)
Possibleiϕ
def
= ¬Beli¬ϕ (DefPossiblei)
Awarenessiϕ
def
= X−1¬Beli ϕ ∧Beli ϕ (DefAwarenessi)
i:α-done reads “agent i has done action α”; Happensi:αϕ reads “agent i is doing action α
and ϕ will be true next instant”; Afteri:αϕ reads “ϕ is true after any execution of α by i”;
Donei:αϕ reads “agent i has done action α and ϕ was true at previous instant”; Fϕ reads “ϕ will
be true in some future instants”; Goali ϕ reads “agent i has the goal (chosen preference) that ϕ
be true”; Intendi α reads “agent i intends to do α”; Capableiα reads “agent i is capable to do
α”; Possibleiϕ reads “agent i believes that it is possible ϕ”; Awarenessiϕ reads “agent i has
just experienced that ϕ is true”.
Semantics. For temporal operators, we use a semantics based on linear time described by a
sequence (or story) of time points. (This semantics is very close to CTL* [CES86]) A frame F
is a 4-tuples 〈H,B,C ,G 〉 where: H is a set of stories that are represented as sequences of time
points, where each time point is identified by an integer z ∈ Z, a time point z in a story h is called
a situation < h,z >; B is the set of all Bi such that Bi(h,z) denotes the set of stories believed
as being possible by the agent i in the situation < h,z >; C is the set of all Ci such that Ci(h,z)
denotes the set of stories chosen by the agent i in the situation < h,z >; G is the set of all GI
such that GI(h,z) denotes the set of stories which are publicly grounded in the group I of agents,
in the situation < h,z >.
All the accessibility relations Bi are serial1, transitive2 and euclidean3. This semantic is com-
pletely standard in epistemic logic (see [Hin62, GG06]) All the accessibility relations GI are
serial, transitive and euclidean (This is similar to the operator group grounding introduced by
Gaudou et al. [GHL06]). All the accessibility Ci are serial. Moreover, we impose for every z∈Z
that: if h′ ∈Bi(h,z) then Ci(h,z) = Ci(h′,z). It means that if an agent believes that the world h’
is possible from the world h, then the set of his/her preference worlds from h and h’ are the same.
In other terms, the worlds an agent prefers and the ones that agent believes that s/he prefers are
the same (briefly, the agent is conscious about his/her preferences, and s/he prefers what s/he
believes that s/he prefers).
A model M is a couple 〈F ,V 〉 where F is a frame and V is a function associating each
atomic proposition p with the set V (p) of couple (h,z) where p is true. Truth conditions are
1 for every w1 ∈M , there is w2 such that w1Biw2
2 if w1Biw2 and w2Biw3, then w1Biw3
3 if w1Biw2 and w1Biw3, then w2Biw3
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defined as follows:
M ,h,z |= p iff (h,z) ∈ V (p)
M ,h,z |= Xϕ iff M ,h,z+1 |= ϕ
M ,h,z |= X−1ϕ iff M ,h,z−1 |= ϕ
M ,h,z |= Gϕ iff M ,h,z′ |= ϕ for every z′ ≥ z
M ,h,z |= Beli ϕ iff M ,h′,z |= ϕ for every (h′,z) ∈Bi(h,z)
M ,h,z |= Choicei ϕ iff M ,h′,z |= ϕ for every (h′,z) ∈ Ci(h,z)
M ,h,z |= GrdIϕ iff M ,h′,z |= ϕ for every (h′,z) ∈ GI(h,z)
Other truth conditions are defined as usual.
Axiomatics. Due to our linear time semantics, the temporal operators satisfy the following
principles:
i:α-happens↔Xi:α-done (1)
Xϕ ↔¬X¬ϕ (2)
ϕ ↔XX−1ϕ (3)
ϕ ↔X−1Xϕ (4)
Gϕ ↔ϕ ∧XGϕ (5)
G(ϕ → Xϕ)→(ϕ → Gϕ) (6)
Beli and Choicei operators are defined in a normal modal logic plus (D) axioms. Thus, if 
represents a Beli operator or Choicei operator:
ϕ
ϕ
(RN)
(ϕ → ψ)→(ϕ →ψ) (K)
ϕ →¬¬ϕ (D)
For example, axiom D applied to operator Beli is DBeli , which is described as: Beli ϕ →
¬Beli¬ϕ .
(RN) means that all theorems are believed (respectively: chosen) by every agent i; (K)
means that beliefs (respectively: choices) are closed under material implication for every agent
i; (D) means that beliefs (respectively: choices) of every agent i are rational: they cannot be
contradictory.
The Beli operators satisfy the following principles of introspection:
Beli ϕ ↔BeliBeli ϕ (4Beli )
¬Beli ϕ ↔Beli¬Beli ϕ (5Beli )
that means that agent i is conscious of its beliefs and of its disbeliefs.
The following principle follows from the semantical constraint between belief accessibility
relation and choice accessibility relation, and from axiom (D) for Beli :
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Choicei ϕ ↔BeliChoicei ϕ (4BC)
¬Choicei ϕ ↔Beli¬Choicei ϕ (5BC)
that means that agent i is conscious of its choices and of its dischoices.
The sound and complete axiomatization of GrdI operator is defined as the one of common
belief operator (also called mutual belief), which is closed to the operator described in Walton
and Krabbe [WK95], also introduced by Gaudou et al. [GHL06]:
ϕ
GrdIϕ
(RNGrdI )
GrdI(ϕ → ψ)→(GrdIϕ → GrdIψ) (KGrdI )
GrdIϕ →¬GrdI¬ϕ (DGrdI )
GrdIϕ →GrdIGrdIϕ (4GrdI )
¬GrdIϕ →GrdI¬GrdIϕ (5GrdI )
Axiom (RNGrdI ) means that every tautology is public ground. Axiom (KGrdI ) means that if
ϕ is publicly grounded in I and that ϕ implies ψ then ψ is also publicly grounded in I. Ax-
iom (DGrdI ) means that the set of grounded informations is consistent: it can not be the case that
both ϕ and ¬ϕ are simultaneously grounded. The positive introspection axiom (4GrdI ) and neg-
ative introspection axiom (5GrdI ) account for the public character of GrdI . From these collective
awareness results: if ϕ has (resp. has not) been grounded then it is established that ϕ has (resp.
has not) been grounded.
Linear time semantics entail the following principles:
Gϕ →Afteri:αϕ (7)
Happensi:αϕ →After j:β ϕ (8)
Afteri:αϕ ↔¬Happensi:α¬ϕ (9)
Axiom (7) describe the relationship between time and action: if henceforth ϕ is true then after
every action α of every agent i, ϕ will be true. (Note that the converse is not valid: it is possible
that ϕ be true after every action α of every agent i performed in a situation < h,z >, and that ϕ
be false at time z′ > z.)
As time is linear, actions are deterministic on a given history. Thus, axiom (8) reads: if agent i
is just about to perform α after what ϕ will be true, then after every performance of every action
β by every agent j, ϕ will be true. In other words, if action α leads to a time point where ϕ is
true, then every action performed by every agent leads to this time point.
Finally, axiom (9) means that Afteri:α and Happensi:α operators are dual operators. This
property is fair with respect to dynamic logic [HKT00].
3 Formalization of the cognitive structure of emotion
In this section, we present the formalization of emotions, based on their cognitive structure as
proposed by Ortony et al. [OCC88], Frijda [Fri86] as well as those of Reisenzei [Rei09] and
Scherer et al. [Sch01].
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Joy/Distress. The cognitive structure of Joy consists of two main factors: (i) a proposition
ϕ is desirable for agent i, and (ii) agent i just experienced that ϕ is the case. To formalize
the first factor, we consider that agent i desiring ϕ means that i wants ϕ to be the case. So we
formalize desire as a goal (chosen preference). Therefore, the first factor is potentially formalized
as Goali ϕ , the second factor may be formalized as Beli ϕ .
However, we assume that emotion is triggered at the moment when all its factors are fulfilled,
and that its intensity then decreases with time [dS01, Fri86]. Accordingly, we include a time
factor into most emotional formulas. Thus, the first factor of Joy in particular means that agent
i now recalls that at the previous instant, s/he desired ϕ , until experiencing that ϕ was in fact
true: BeliX−1Goali ϕ . It means that in order to be joyful, agent i must keep in mind his desire in
the previous instant. Hereafter, we add this analysis for almost emotional formulas. The second
factor means that agent i has just experienced that ϕ is true and did not previously know it:
Awarenessiϕ .
The same analysis applies to Distress, except that in the first factor of Distress, ϕ is unde-
sirable for agent i, which we assume to mean that agent i desired ¬ϕ: BeliX−1Goali¬ϕ . We
accordingly formalize the concept of Joy and Distress:
Definition 1 (Joy/Distress)
Joyi ϕ
def
=BeliX−1Goali ϕ ∧Awarenessiϕ
Distressi ϕ
def
=BeliX−1Goali¬ϕ ∧Awarenessiϕ
To illustrate the definition of Joy, we can say that an individual is joyful when he has just
realized that he won the lottery (Awarenessman(win lottery)) with the trivial assumption that
he had been desiring to win the lottery (BelmanX−1Goalman (win lottery)). In contrast, to illus-
trate the definition of Distress, we can say that an individual feels distress when she learns she
has lost her job (Awarenesswoman(lost job)) assuming that she had the goal not to lose her job
(BelwomanX−1Goalwoman¬(lost job)).
Hope/Fear. The cognitive structure of Hope consists of two factors: (i) a proposition ϕ is
desirable for agent i, and (ii) agent i believes that ϕ may be true in the future. To formalize the
first factor, we consider that ϕ is not true at the moment when i hopes for it: Goali ϕ .
We interpret the second factor, as meaning that among all of possible future worlds, agent i
believes that there is at least one world in which ϕ will be the case. In other terms, agent i does
not believe that ϕ will be false in all of possible future worlds: PossibleiFϕ . If i believes that
ϕ can never be the case in all of possible future worlds, then i has no ground for hope.
The same analysis applies to Fear, except that ϕ is now undesirable for agent i: Goali¬ϕ . We
accordingly formalize the concept of Hope and Fear:
Definition 2 (Hope/Fear)
Hopei ϕ
def
=Goali ϕ ∧PossibleiFϕ
Feari ϕ
def
=Goali¬ϕ ∧PossibleiFϕ
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For example, a debutante is hopeful about being asked to dance, for she thinks it is possi-
ble (PossiblegirlF(being asked to dance)) and this is what she wants (Goalgirl (being asked to
dance)). In contrast, an employee fears to be fired when he does not wish to be fired
(Goalemployee¬( f ired)) but believes it is a possibility PossibleemployeeF(to be fired)).
Satisfaction/Disappointment. The cognitive structure of Satisfaction consists of three factors:
(i) agent i desired a proposition ϕ , (ii) agent i used to believe that ϕ might be true in the near
future, and (iii) agent i now experiences that ϕ is really the case. The first two factors mean that
now, agent keeps in mind that at the previous instant, s/he desired ϕ and believed that ϕ could
be true in the future (BeliX−1(Goali ϕ ∧ PossibleiFϕ)) (cf. the analysis of the second factor
of Hope). The last factor means that i now experiences that ϕ is true, but did not know it the
previous instant (Awarenessiϕ).
The difference in the case of Disappointment is agent recalls that, in the previous instant, s/he
desired ¬ϕ instead of ϕ , and s/he believed that ¬ϕ was possibly true in the future
(BeliX−1(Goali¬ϕ ∧PossibleiF¬ϕ)). We formalize Satisfaction and Disappointment as
Definition 3 (Satisfaction/Disappointment)
Satisfactioni ϕ
def
=BeliX−1(Goali ϕ ∧PossibleiFϕ)∧Awarenessiϕ
Disappointmenti ϕ
def
=BeliX−1(Goali¬ϕ ∧PossibleiF¬ϕ)∧Awarenessiϕ
For example, when the debutante realizes that she is indeed asked to dance
(Awarenessgirl(asked to dance)) she is satisfied. Were she not to be asked to dance
(Awarenessgirl(not asked to dance)), she would feel disappointed.
We can point out the relations between Satisfaction, Disappointment and Hope:
Satisfactioni ϕ ↔BeliX−1Hopei ϕ ∧Awarenessiϕ (10)
Disappointmenti ϕ ↔BeliX
−1Hopei¬ϕ ∧Awarenessiϕ (11)
The relation between Satisfaction and Joy can be formalized as Proposition 1: if we feel
satisfaction about something, then we will also feel joy about it.
Proposition 1 (Satisfaction implies Joy)
Satisfactioni ϕ →Joyi ϕ
Fear-confirmed/Relief. The cognitive structure of Fear-confirmed consists of three factors: (i)
a proposition ϕ was undesirable for agent i, (ii) agent i believed that ϕ might be true in the near
future, and (iii) agent i now experiences that ϕ is really true.
We use the same analysis as for Satisfaction, except agent recalls that in the previous instant,
¬ϕ was desirable for agent i (BeliX−1Goali¬ϕ).
The difference in the case of Relief is agent recalls that, in the previous instant, s/he desired
ϕ (BeliX−1Goali ϕ), and believed that ¬ϕ might be true in the near future (BeliX−1(Goali ϕ ∧
PossibleiF¬ϕ)). We formalize Fear-confirmed and Relief as:
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Definition 4 (Fear-confirmed/Relief)
FearConfirmedi ϕ
def
=BeliX−1(Goali¬ϕ ∧PossibleiFϕ)∧Awarenessiϕ
Reliefi ϕ
def
=BeliX−1(Goali ϕ ∧PossibleiF¬ϕ)∧Awarenessiϕ
For example, the employee’s fear of being fired is confirmed when he learns that he is indeed
about to be fired (Awarenessemployee( f ired)) which he had been afraid of
(BelemployeeX−1(Goalemployee¬( f ired)∧ PossibleemployeeF( f ired))). In contrast, were he to
learn that he is not going to be fired (Awarenessemployee(not fired)), he would feel relief.
We can also point out the relations between Fear-confirmed, Relief and Fear:
FearConfirmedi ϕ ↔BeliX−1Feari ϕ ∧Awarenessiϕ (12)
Reliefi ϕ ↔BeliX−1Feari¬ϕ ∧Awarenessiϕ (13)
The relation between Fear-confirmed and Distress is stated in Proposition 2: if our fears about
something are confirmed, then we feel distressed.
Proposition 2 (Fear-confirmed implies Distress)
FearConfirmedi ϕ → Distressi ϕ
4 Formalization of Trust
We now present the formalization of trust and distrust based on the cognitive definition of Castel-
franchi and colleagues [CF01, CFL08].
Trust. We formalize the concept of trust based on Castelfranchi and Falcone’s definition [CF01]
of trust in action which says that agent i trusts agent j to ensure ϕ by performing action α if and
only if agent i desires to achieve ϕ (Goali ϕ), and agent i expects that: (i) ϕ can be achieved by
doing action α (BeliAfter j:αϕ); (ii) agent j is able to perform action α (BeliCapable jα); and
(iii) agent j has the intention to do such an action (BeliIntend j α).
However, these three factors are only necessary conditions, but not sufficient ones. For ex-
ample, imagine that a robber wants to steal something located on the second floor of a mansion.
There is a nurse on the first floor. The robber desires that the nurse stays where she is, because it
makes his robbery possible. He also believes that it is possible that the nurse will stay where she
is, and that it is actually her intention. Thus, the three conditions are satisfied, but we are reluc-
tant nonetheless to say that the robber trusts the nurse to stay where she is in order to allow for
his stealing, because there is no agreement between the nurse (trustee) and the robber (trustor).
So here we need to add another condition for trust: an agreement between trustor and trustee that
the trustee will perform such an action (GrdItrustee : α-happens), where I = {trustor, trustee}.
We accordingly formalize the concept of trust as:
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Definition 5 (Trust)
Trusti, j(α,ϕ)
def
=Goali ϕ ∧BeliAfter j:αϕ ∧BeliCapable jα∧
BeliIntend j α ∧Grd{i, j} j:α-happens
For example, a boss trusts his secretary to prepare a report in order to present it at a company
meeting because the boss desires the report (Goalboss (report)), and in his opinion, the report
can be possibly ready after the secretary prepares it (Belboss A f tersecretary:prepare(report)), the
secretary has the ability and intention to prepare the report (BelbossCapablesecretary(prepare)∧
BelbossIntendsecretary (prepare))). It is clear that in the relation between the boss and his secre-
tary, there is an agreement that the secretary will prepare the report in time
(Grdboss,secretarysecretary : prepare-happens).
Distrust. We also adopt the definition of distrust given by Castelfranchi et al. [CFL08] which
says that agent i distrusts agent j to ensure ϕ by performing action α if and only if agent i desires
to achieve ϕ (Goali ϕ), and agent i believes that at least one of these conditions is fulfilled: (i)
agent j is not in the capacity to do action α: Beli¬After j:αϕ , or (ii) agent j is able to do α
but he has not intention to do α: PossibleiAfter j:αϕ ∧ Beli¬Intend j α . We accordingly
formalize this concept as:
Definition 6 (Distrust)
DisTrusti, j(α,ϕ)
def
= Goali ϕ ∧ (Beli¬After j:αϕ∨
(PossibleiAfter j:αϕ ∧Beli¬Intend j α))
For example, in spite of desiring the report (Goalboss (report)), the boss does not trust a
new employee to prepare it because he believes the new employee is unable to perform that
task(Belboss¬Afteremployee:prepare(report)).
From this definition, we can decompose the concept of distrust based only on the ability of
trustee:
Definition 7 (Distrust based on ability)
C-DisTrusti, j(α,ϕ)
def
=Goali ϕ ∧Beli¬After j:αϕ
5 Trust-Related Emotions
5.1 Formal Relations
Trust and Hope. Trust and Hope have an important relation because they both feature a pos-
itive expectation [CF01]. When i trusts j, i has a positive expectation about j’s power and
performance. Hope also implies some positive expectation. The greater the expectations, the
deeper the trust; and, conversely, the deeper the disappointment when expectations are unreal-
ized [Bry07]. We formalize the former relation as Proposition 3, the latter as Proposition 5.
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Proposition 3 (Trust implies Hope)
Trusti, j(α,ϕ)→Hopeiϕ
This means that when we trust someone about an action that will bring some results, we are
hopeful that the results will be obtained. For example, in a commercial transaction, when the
buyer trusts his seller to send him a product after payment (Trustbuyer,seller(send,receipt)), he
will be hopeful that he will receive the product (Hopebuyer receive product). This proposition will
be proved by applying Lemma 1: if we believe that ϕ is true after every execution of action α ,
and that someone is able to do α , then we believe that there is at least a future world in which ϕ
is true.
Lemma 1
BeliAfter j:αϕ ∧BeliCapable jα →PossibleiFϕ
Once we trust someone to do an action to bring us something, we hope for the positive result
of the action. In case of success, we feel satisfaction (formalized as Proposition 4). Conversely,
in case of failure, we feel disappointment (formalized as Proposition 5).
Proposition 4 (Successful Trust implies Satisfaction)
BeliDone j:αTrusti, j(α,ϕ)∧Awarenessiϕ →Satisfactioniϕ
This means that when we believe that what we trusted has now occurred, we are satisfied about
it. For example, when the boss trusted his secretary to prepare the report
(Donesecretary:prepareTrustboss,secretary(prepare,having report)), and on the morning of the day
after, he has received the report (Belboss having report), then he is satisfied
(Satisfactionbosshaving report). This proposition has a corollary which is deduced from
Proposition 1 and 4: When we experience that what we trusted has really occurred, we will
also feel joy about it.
Corollary 1
BeliDone j:αTrusti, j(α,ϕ)∧Awarenessiϕ →Joyiϕ
Proposition 5 (Unsuccessful Trust implies Disappointment)
BeliDone j:αTrusti, j(α,ϕ)∧Awarenessi¬ϕ →Disappointmenti¬ϕ
This means that we feel disappointed if what we trusted does not in fact occur. For example, a
businessman trusted his partner to arrive on time to negotiate a contract. The businessman feels
disappointed if the partner has not yet arrived at the scheduled time.
DisTrust and Fear. Distrust features a negative expectation, involving fear of the other [LW00,
AACS08]. We state the relation between Distrust based on ability and Fear as Proposition 6.
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Proposition 6 (DisTrust implies Fear)
C-DisTrusti, j(α,ϕ)→Feari¬ϕ
This means that if we distrust someone to do an action to bring us something then we fear
that our desire might not be fulfilled. For example, the boss might distrust his assistant with
the preparation of a report he needs, and more specifically distrusts him to finish the report by
the next morning (DisTrustboss,assistant( f inish,report)). Therefore, he is fearful that he might
miss the report the next morning (Fearboss¬report). This proposition will be proved by applying
Lemma 2: if we believe that someone is unable to do an action to bring about something, then
we believe that there is at least a future world without the expected result of this action.
Lemma 2
Beli¬After j:αϕ →PossibleiF¬ϕ
Once we distrust someone to do an action to bring about something, we experience fear. If the
results are indeed negative, we feel fear-confirmed (formalized as Proposition 7). If, however the
action is in fact successfully performed, we feel relief (formalized as Proposition 8).
Proposition 7 (Confirmation of DisTrust implies Fear-confirmed)
BeliDone j:αC-DisTrusti, j(α,ϕ)∧Awarenessi¬ϕ →FearConfirmedi¬ϕ
If the boss realizes that his assistant really did not finish the report (Belboss¬report), he feels
fear-confirmed (FearConfirmedboss¬report). Combining the two Propositions 2 and 7, we
arrive at a corollary: when we experience that what we distrusted has now happened, we feel
distressed about it.
Corollary 2
BeliDone j:αC-DisTrusti, j(α,ϕ)∧Awarenessi¬ϕ →Distressi¬ϕ
Proposition 8 (Non-confirmation of DisTrust implies Relief)
BeliDone j:αC-DisTrusti, j(α,ϕ)∧Awarenessiϕ →Reliefiϕ
If the boss discovers that his assistant did in fact finish the report (Belboss report), he feels
relieved (Reliefbossreport).
5.2 Behavioral validation
Although the propositions that we proved in the previous section are intuitively plausible, some
of them have not yet received behavioral validation from the field of experimental psychology.
We decided to collect empirical data concerning three propositions in this article, related to the
emotions that follow trust when it is confirmed (Proposition 4), and when it is unconfirmed
(Proposition 5); and the emotions that follow distrust, when it is unconfirmed (Proposition 8) 4.
4 We could not test Proposition 7 for a linguistic reason: Neither in French nor in Vietnamese (the two languages
used in our experiment) could we find an everyday term equivalent to ‘fear confirmed’.
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Satisfaction Relief Disappointment
Trust Distrust Trust Distrust Trust Distrust
Success 4.9 (1.5) 4.6 (1.6) 2.8 (1.9) 3.6 (1.9) 1.1 (0.6) 1.3 (0.8)
Failure 1.1 (0.5) 1.4 (1.0) 1.3 (1.0) 1.3 (0.9) 4.6 (1.7) 3.2 (1.4)
Table 1: Mean and standard deviations of affective ratings, as a function of Trust and Outcome.
Following the analysis in (Section 4) which argues that trust is the conjunction of the intention,
the capacity, and the agreement of trustee, the presence of Agreement is intentionally fixed for
the future test. We therefore operationalize Trust as the conjunction of Intention and Capacity,
and Distrust as the three remaining cases. Participants to the survey read 8 different stories, fol-
lowing a 2×2×2 within-subject design. The variables manipulated in the stories were Intention
(Yes/No), Capacity (Yes/No), and Outcome (Success/Failure). As an example, here is the story
corresponding to Intention = Yes, Capacity = Yes, and Outcome = Success.
Mr. Boss is the marketing director of a big company. He needs an important financial report
before a meeting tomorrow morning, but he has no time to write it because of other priorities.
He asks Mr. Support to prepare it and put it on his desk before tomorrow morning.
• Mr. Boss believes that Mr. Support has the intention to prepare the report in time.
• Mr. Boss believes that Mr. Support is able to prepare the report in time.
The morning after, Mr. Boss finds the report on his desk when he arrives. In your opinion,
what does he feel?
In the condition Intention = No, “Mr. Boss believes that Mr. Support has the intention to
prepare the report in time” was replaced with “Mr. Boss believes that Mr. Support has no
intention to prepare the report in time.” In the condition Capacity = No, “Mr. Boss believes that
Mr. Support is able to prepare the report in time” was replaced with “Mr. Boss believes that Mr.
Support is unable to prepare the report in time.” Finally, in the condition Outcome = Failure,
“Mr. Boss finds the report on his desk when he arrives” was replaced with “Mr. Boss does not
find the report on his desk when he arrives.”
After reading each story, participants rated the extent to which the main character would feel
each of 7 emotions, which included our target emotions, satisfaction, disappointment, and relief;
but also some emotions that we included for exploratory purposes, such as anger or thankfulness.
Ratings used a 6-point scale anchored at Not at all and Totally.
A total of 100 participants took part in an online survey. The survey was offered in two
languages, French (30% of the final sample) and Vietnamese (70%). Language was entered
as a control variable in all statistical analyses, but added only a small overall main effect on
participants’ responses, and will not be discussed any further.
Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 1. Participants’ responses were analyzed by means
of a repeated-measure analysis of variance, aimed at detecting statistically reliable effects of
Trust and Outcome on our emotions of interest.
Satisfaction. Unsurprisingly, the analysis of variance detected a huge effect of Outcome,
F(1,98) = 597, p < .001, accounting for most of the observed variance, η2p = .86. In other terms,
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Satisfaction is almost perfectly predicted by Outcome alone. The analysis, however, also detects
a comparatively small interaction effect Outcome × Trust, F(1,98) = 8.8, p < .01, η2p = .08,
reflecting the fact that success is even more pleasant in case of trust. Table 1 shows that the
biggest score of Satisfaction is in the case of Trust follows a Success: M = 4.9, SD < 1.5. The
data are in line with what was expected from Proposition 4.
Relief. The analysis detected main effects of Trust, F(1,98) = 19.1, p < .001, η2p = .23; and
Outcome, F(1,98) = 127, p < .001, η2p = .80. However, these main effects were qualified by an
interaction effect Trust × Outcome, F(1,98) = 12.3, p < .001, η2p = .31. Table 1 shows that the
score of Relief is especially high in the case of Success is obtained despite of Distrust: M = 3.6,
SD < 1.9. This interaction reflects our expectation (Proposition 8).
Disappointment. The analysis detected main effects of Trust, F(1,98) = 28.4, p < .001,
η2p = .16; and Outcome, F(1,98) = 389, p < .001, η
2
p = .56. However, these main effects were
qualified by an interaction effect Trust × Outcome, F(1,98) = 44.7, p < .001, η2p = .11. Table
1 shows that the score of Disappointment is especially high in the case of Failure is obtained
despite of Trust: M = 4.6, SD < 1.7. This interaction reflects our expectation (Proposition 5).
6 Conclusion
This paper introduced a logical framework that can represent the cognitive structure of emotions,
trust, and the formal relations between them. In other terms, it enables to represent the effect of
trust (and distrust) on emotions. Furthermore, this logical framework respects the instantaneity
of emotions that previous logics of emotions did not fulfill. Finally, the formal relations between
emotion and trust laid bare by the logical framework were subjected to a behavioral validation
following the methods of experimental psychology. The success of this behavioral validation
gives strong support to our approach, which is shown to capture lay users’ intuitions about trust-
related emotion.
Although we have added time factor into almost emotional formulas, which enables to elim-
inate rightly emotion when the relevant event has passed a long time, but it have not yet helped
us to represent the nature of continuous intensity of emotions. Additionally, this paper has
formalized only the effect of trust/distrust on emotions but not yet the effect of emotions on
trust/distrust. These current limitations are also the potential perspective for our future research.
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